RESEARCH Balancing accessibility and fraud prevention in housing assistance

JPMorgan Chase Institute Take
 

任何政府援助项目的一个核心问题是，如何尽快帮助到需要帮助的人，同时确保那些接受帮助的人确实需要帮助?

Studies show mortgage forbearance programs that require no documentation were largely utilized as intended by homeowners.

Recent JPMorgan Chase Institute research examined this question in the context of mortgage forbearance.¹ Early on in the COVID-19 pandemic, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act provided most homeowners with up to a year² of payment relief if they attested to a COVID-related hardship with no documentation requirement. Using administrative mortgage servicing and checking account data, we found little evidence of moral hazard associated with the program.

与其他房主相比，使用缓期还贷的借款人收入下降幅度更大，他们的收入变化与那些没有得到缓期还贷保护的违约者相似. In addition, 相对于非延期借款人，延期借款人更有可能失去劳动收入并领取失业救济金. In fact, of those we can observe receiving direct-deposited unemployment insurance (UI), 84%的人处于缓期并继续支付抵押贷款，只有1%的人处于缓期但未支付抵押贷款. In other words, 几乎所有接受失业保险并签署了延期协议的人，在他们有能力的时候，都会继续支付抵押贷款.³ (Figure 1)

图1:那些失去工作并领取失业保险的人绝大多数选择了忍耐，但没有使用它.

In contrast, Great Recession-era programs with strict documentation requirements suffered from low uptake.

During the Great Recession, programs aimed at helping struggling homeowners came with significant documentation requirements. Studies have since shown that those requirements hampered the success of many of these programs. 重灾区基金(HHF)成立于2010年，旨在为失业或就业不足的房主提供抵押贷款援助. By the end of 2016, only 292,000 homeowners had benefited from the HHF. 住房负担得起的失业方案(UP)于2010年推出，旨在向无法支付抵押贷款的失业房主提供援助. At of the end of 2016, only 46,485 homeowners were participating in the UP program.⁴ Similarly, mortgage modification programs such as the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) also had low uptake. Between March 2009 and June 2010 about 55 percent (almost 675,由于房主无法提供必要的收入核实文件，因此取消了HAMP试验修改.⁵ By April 2015, 100多万房主被拒绝修改HAMP，因为他们没有提供及时完成对其请求的评估所需的财务和/或困难核查文件.⁶ Finally, research has shown that similar requirements associated with refinancing programs during this time (e.g., the Home Affordable Refinance Program) limited uptake to less than 50 percent of eligible borrowers. As a result, these refinancing programs had modest effects on foreclosure rates.⁷

JPMC Institute data also show little evidence of strategic default among homeowners

During the Great Recession, 许多房主资不抵债，政策制定者担心战略违约——一旦抵押贷款超过房屋价值，房主就会逃避债务的风险. Evidence suggests, by and large, homeowners did not do this. Using mortgage servicing and deposit account data, JPMC Institute research shows that for borrowers who defaulted on their mortgage, default closely followed a negative income shock regardless of their level of home equity. This was true even when the homeowner was deeply underwater.⁸ (Figure 2) This result is inconsistent with the simple type of strategic default described above. Ganong and Noel (2020), using JPMC Institute data, compare underwater borrowers to a group with no strategic default motive: borrowers with positive home equity. 他们发现，只有3%的违约完全是由负资产引起的，而不良事件是97%的抵押贷款违约的必要条件.⁹ 这表明房主认为他们的房子不仅仅是一种金融资产，而且优先考虑能够留在他们的房子里.

Figure 2: Default followed a negative income shock for borrowers across the LTV distribution, 为一个简单的战略违约模型提供了暗示性的证据，即深度资不抵债的借款人仅仅因为资不抵债而停止支付抵押贷款.

租房者援助计划从根本上不同于抵押贷款延期计划，但如果文件要求过于繁重，也可能会出现低使用率

JPMC Institute research has shown that compared to mortgage holders, 在大流行之前，租房者的财务基础较弱，在大流行期间经历了更大的失业和劳动收入下降. Furthermore, even though generous expansions of UI and EIP checks increased total income for many renters, more than one in five saw their total income decrease by more than 10 percent. Finally, 租房者的储蓄水平要低得多，尽管政府实施了刺激计划，但他们的相对地位在大流行期间没有明显改善，因为到年底，他们比抵押贷款持有人消耗了更多的刺激产生的额外储蓄. Importantly, 这些结果可能代表了租房者的“最佳情况”，因为研究所的数据采集的是收入偏高的租房者样本. 一项包括更多低收入租房者的分析可能会显示租房者的财务状况更糟，尤其是那些银行存款不足或已经在为住房支付而挣扎的人.¹⁰ These results point to renters needing some form of rental assistance.

While rental assistance programs already existed in some specific localities, 大流行期间的主要租赁援助形式于2020年12月通过了《12bet官方》, which established a $25 billion Federal Emergency Rental Assistance Program for state and local governments. In order to apply for this program, renters were required to fill out forms and upload documents proving unemployment or income loss, risk of homelessness or housing instability, and income that did not exceed 80 percent of area median income (AMI).¹¹ Such extensive requirements may, similar to the housing assistance programs of the Great Recession, result in many renters unable to access assistance because they are unable to demonstrate their need (e.g., they require assistance filling out the application forms, their income is difficult to document, etc.). 值得承认的是，租金援助从根本上不同于抵押贷款减免:租金援助向租房者提供资金转移, while forbearance is a deferral of a debt obligation. Additionally, renters may exhibit different behavior than homeowners when it comes to housing payments. That said, 关于道德风险、抵押贷款忍耐和大衰退时期住房计划的研究仍然具有指导意义. As such, 政策制定者可能会考虑重新审视在租房援助项目中是否找到了可获得性和防止欺诈之间的适当平衡.